Introduction
The introduction of compétition has given rise to important changes in network industries. This is particularly true for télécommunications, in which former protected monopolies hâve been exposed to compétition by new operators in most industrialised countries. Deregulation has also induced entry by new actors, from previously distinct industries (cable, railroads, etc. ).
An important dimension of this reorganization process consists in the interaction between regulatory institutions. Indeed, new players are often either unregulated (as for information technologies) or under the jurisdiction of différent regulatory bodies (as for broadcasting and télécommunications), although a substantial amount of regulatory oversight is still needed (for interconnection or public service obligations for instance). This raises important issues about the domain of specialization of thèse multiple regulators, as well as about the coordination of their décisions.
We are indebted to Jean-Jacques Laffont for stimulating and clarifying discussions during this work. We gratefully acknowledge comments and useful suggestions made by two anonymous référées. The usual disclaimer applies.
Récent research has started to study some of the trade-offs involved in the design of regulatory institutions for thèse industries.1 For télécommuni cations, the traditional paradigm for régulation is being called into question. Some countries hâve even proceeded to a (partial) substitution of régula tion by compétition policy. For instance, New Zealand had decided to give up régulation and to rely solely on compétition policy as its new structure for industry supervision, following the Commerce Act of 1986. Expérience has shown, however, that this was not sufficient and a Ministerial Inquiry into the régulation of télécommunications, released in September 2000, has put forward the need for more régulation, in order to rule interconnection and to reduce the market power of the incumbent. But economists still cannot provide much guidance on either the transition from régulation to compétition policy, or the interaction between thèse two modes of industry supervision. The spécifie question that we try to address in this paper is the following : When are the différent supervision authorities (i.e., régula tion and compétition policy in our context) mainly substitutable, or mainly complementary ?
Numerous forms of régulation and antitrust enforcement exist. Our attempt therefore hinges on a bare-bone description of the functioning of thèse institutions. We shall draw upon the following considérations. First, regulatory agencies hâve wider control rights than antitrust authorities.
Indeed, the former engages in detailed régulation of activities whereas the latter assesses ex post the lawfulness of conducts. Second, régulation usually resorts to an ex ante contractual agreement whereas compétition policy adopts an ex post monitoring of the industry, even though intervention rules are usually determined ex ante. Third, regulatory agencies, with a narrow mandate, often benefit from a much better knowledge of the industry than antitrust authorities, that hâve a quasi-universai mandate : regulators engage in a continuing and long-lasting relationship with a spécifie industry whereas compétition policy authorities only intervene in a punctual way.
The framework we adopt can be described as follows. We consider a dominant operator and a fringe producing differentiated (final) goods.
The fringe and the dominant operator are taken to hâve identical efficiency parameters. The fringe is composed of firms that can décide to collude, and therefore act as a monopoly, or to behave competitively, in which case Bertrand-Nash compétition takes place in their market.
The dominant operator is supervised by a regulatory agency. This agency offers a contract, which consists in the price of the regulated good and a transfer given to this firm to cover its costs. We study the possibility of complementing régulation with supervision of the fringe, by a compétition policy authority. Throughout most of the analysis, we drastically simplify our model by assuming that the compétition authority either intervenes -in which case she can deter, at no cost, the fringe from colluding -or does not intervene, and lets the fringe act as a monopolist. Any considérations on the cost of antitrust intervention, or on potential coordination problems (due, say, to confiicting objectives) between regulatory and compétition authorities would lessen the benefits of complementing régulation with compétition policy. We are thus focusing on the case in which it is the most bénéficiai, in a partially regulated environment, to add supervision of the fringe to régulation of the dominant operator.
We first build upon the analysis of Tirole (1990), (1993) , to study how the regulatory agency should départ from standard RamseyBoiteux pricing to account for the fringe's incentive to collude. When the fringe behaves competitively, there is no need to distort the price of the regulated good since the regulator completely internalizes the social cost of the unregulated good and the fringe behaves in a socially optimal way. However, when the fringe colludes, the regulator must distort the provision of the regulated good to implicitly subsidize the collusive fringe in order to give it an incentive to increase its production. With substitutes, this requires to increase the price of the regulated good, whereas with compléments, this price has to be decreased in order to increase the demand faced by the fringe.
We show that enforcing a compétitive behavior is always welfareenhancing when goods are compléments. Indeed, it not only increases consumers' surplus, it also increases the revenue of the regulated firm, thereby reducing the need for distortionary taxation.
This resuit does not hold with substitutes : when goods are strongly substitutes, enforcing a compétitive behavior from the fringe is detrimental to welfare. Indeed, a compétitive fringe strongly reduces the revenues from the sale of the regulated good; this requires to increase the subsidy that must be paid to the regulated firm, which has a social cost when public funds are costly. When goods are weak substitutes, antitrust intervention is always bénéficiai, since it enables to align the fringe's behavior with the socially optimal one, and the loss caused by an increase in distortionary taxation is not too large. Finally, the larger the cost of public funds is, the larger is the degree of substitutability below which it is socially désirable not to enforce compétitive pricing by the fringe.
Our model therefore shows that the substitutability/complementarity between supervision authorities strongly dépends on the interaction between final product markets.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section (Section 2) we describe our model. We then study in Section 3 the gain obtained by complementing régulation of the dominant operator with compétition policy on the fringe. Section 4 présents various extensions of the initial setting.
And Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. Ail proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2
The model
To avoid confusion, a masculine pronoun will be used for the regulatory agency, and a féminine one for the antitrust authority.
We consider a market for two goods, denoted by '1' and '2'. Good 1 is produced by a dominant operator, and good 2 by a fringe.
Consumers
Consumers dérive a gross surplus from the consumption of quantities q\ and q2 given by
Parameter c belongs to (-1,1) and indicates whether goods are demand substitutes (c^0) or compléments (c^0). The associated demand function for good i is3 a(l 4-c) -pi -cpj .
We omit arguments to ease the présentation, when this cannot lead to confusion. Accordingly, the net surplus derived by consumers is NS = GS -
Firms
A fringe ensures the production of good 2. We assume, first, that the fringe is composed of firms that produce at the same constant marginal cost 9 and, second, that thèse firms can perfectly coordinate their décisions in order to maximize their joint profits, given by ir2 = \p2 -0] Q2-If the firms choose not to cooperate, then Bertrand compétition takes place within the fringe, leading to zéro profit in equilibrium. Thèse assumptions are, admittedly.
restrictive but will help us focus on our main issue : Is it always welfareenhancing to complément régulation with compétition policy ?
A dominant operator is in charge of the production of good 1. We adopt the accounting convention that it receives the revenues from the sales of this good. To abstract from considérations based on a différence of efficiency between the fringe and the dominant operator, we assume that the dominant operator's constant marginal cost is also 6.
This marginal cost of production, 0, is known by both the regulatory agency and the compétition policy authority.
Finally, we assume that collusion between the fringe and the dominant operator is not possible.4 It is often argued that intra-market collusion is more easily achievable and enforceable than inter-markets collusion, absent any 'external ways' such as mergers or cross-ownership of shares. Besides, in our model, the regulator, who controls the dominant operator, might be able to observe -and thus prevent -any collusive action jointly undertaken by the regulated firm and the unregulated ones.
The regulatory agency
The regulatory agency only controls the dominant operator, and does not regulate the fringe. Examples of such asymmetric régulation abound : In the télécommunications industry for instance, former protected monopolies are usually still under the jurisdiction of regulatory authorities whereas entrants are typically only subject to light regulatory control. We assume in addition that the quantity produced by the fringe is not contractible. The regulator can thus propose a contract {ti,p\} to the regulated firm, where p\ is the price required for good 1 and t\ is a monetary transfer to compensate this firm for its production cost. The dominant operator's profit function is therefore given by tti = [pi -6]q\ +t\ -F, where F is a fixed cost of production5.
We dénote by A > 0 the shadow cost of public funds. In our partial equilibrium approach, A captures the fact that taxation is distortionary : transferring one unit of money to the regulated firm requires to levy 1 + A units from taxpayers6.
The welfare function is thus given by SW = NS-(1 + X)ti + TTi + 7T2
(1)
The timing
The compétition policy authority intervenes first ; the regulatory agency then contracts with the dominant operator and détermines the price for good 1; finally, the fringe chooses the price of good 2.7
2.5 The compétition policy authority Given its incompleteness, the régulation of the dominant operator might be complemented with supervision of the fringe. We assume that an antitrust authority has access to a costless monitoring technology that enables her to investigate the fringe's behavior and to détermine whether anti-competitive actions hâve taken place.
Our goal is not to détermine the optimal antitrust intervention policy but, rather, to study how compétition policy impacts the regulatory process.
Therefore, we drastically simplify the compétition authority's problem by considering that, if she intervenes, then she can discover collusion by the fringe at no cost and punish heavily the firms. Thus, the first stage in our model simply consists in determining whether enforcing a non-cooperative behavior from the fringe is better than letting collusion occur8. We shall therefore consider the following two situations :
• Under 'antitrust intervention', the fringe is deterred from colluding and behaves as a price-taker :
where superscript 'në stands for 'non collusive fringe'.
• Under 'no antitrust intervention', the fringe has an incentive to collude in order to maximize joint profits :
where superscript 'c' stands for 'collusive fringe'.
Optimal industry supervision
Letp2(pi,0) be the best-response of the (Stackelberg follower) fringe. Since there is complète information, the regulatory contract {t\,pi} offered to 7 We comment on this assumption in Section 4.
8 Suppose that the antitrust authority possesses a monitoring technology that enables to detect collusion when she intervenes on the fringe; suppose that her marginal cost of intervention is null for a given industry.
Then, she can intervene with probability 1 and totally deter collusion if the fine imposed in case of collusion is sufficiently large; or she can let collusion occur when she does not intervene.
the dominant operator only has to ascertain that this firm is willing to participate, or9
IRx(e) : 7T! = [pi " 0]qi(PuP2(pu0)) +h-F^0
Since the dominant operator's profit is socially costly (see Equation (2)), the regulatory agency will set the transfer <i so that the regulated firm earns no rent : IR\ (9) is binding in equilibrium. Optimizing social welfare with respect to price p\ yields the following first-order condition :
As can be seen from Equation (5), différent effects guide the choice of the price for good 1 by the regulatory agency. Their magnitude dépends on the degree of compétition within the fringe.
Antitrust intervention : compétitive fringe
If the compétition policy authority décides to intervene, the fringe is deterred from colluding and p2 = 0. This obviously implies that^= 0.
Moreover, since the fringe behaves in a socially efficient way. there is no need for the regulator to alter the provision of good 1 to affect that of good 2 (i.e., Q §~= p2 -6 = 0). Thus, in the case of a compétitive fringe, Equation where rji is the price elasticity of good 1, i.e., r)x = -^JJ-. When the fringe behaves competitively, the choice of the regulated price is only affected by the direct effect of p\ on welfare. Since transfers are socially costly, the regulatory agency must distort the price of good 1 away from its marginal cost in order to reduce the subsidy given for cost-reimbursement purposes.
Equations (3) and (6) yield the equilibrium priées {p"c,P2°} and enable to obtain the corresponding quantities {q?c, q%c}, which are explicitly given in the Appendix.
No antitrust intervention : collusive fringe
In this case, the collusive fringe acts as a monopolist on its own market. The regulatory agency would like to subsidize the fringe so as to induce a larger production of good 2. The only tool he can use is a réduction of the demand for good 1 when goods are substitutes, or, equivalently, in this case, an increase in p\. Similarly, for complementary goods, the regulatory agency can only use a decrease in pi, so as to increase the demand for good 1, and therefore for good 2.
However, since the regulatory agency acts as the Stackleberg leader of our game, the effect of p\ on the price chosen by the fringe also has to be taken into account : when goods are demand substitutes, there exists a countervailing incentive since the increase in p\ triggers an increase10 in p2
that finally leads to a decrease in q2. Similarly, with demand compléments, decreasing p\ leads to an increase in p2 and therefore to a decrease in the demand for good 2. In our model, the first effect dominâtes since dq2 dq2 dp2 -c dpx dp2 dp, 2(1 -c2)
The regulatory agency thus increases (decreases) p\ when goods are sub stitutes (compléments), so as to account for the incentive of the collusive fringe to reduce its production.
Similarly, the choice of the price of the regulated good 1 must now account for the indirect effect of p2 on q\. When the fringe colludes, the price of good 1 tends to be larger since this always leads to an increase in <7i through the reaction of the fringe (i.e., fj^f^-= 2(i-c2)^^)-
One obtains the following rewriting of the first-order condition associated to p\ when the fringe colludes :
The distortion in the price relative to marginal cost is similar to the standard Ramsey-Boiteux formula, but two additional effects arise, as can be seen from the additional components in Equation (7) : first, the regulator takes into account the fact that the price of good 1 influences the collusive price for good 2, from (4), and therefore welfare; second, he tends to compensate for the margin added to marginal cost 9 by the collusive fringe when it sets the price of good 2. The two effects are weighted according to the degree of complementarity and to the cost of public funds.
Equilibrium priées {pl,p2} and quantities {q^q^} are given in the Appendix.
Comparison
Let us now consider the décision by the antitrust authority, in the first period, to intervene or to let collusion occur.
Proposition 1 With substitutes,
• the price of the regulated good is larger when the fringe colludes than when it behaves competitively,
• the regulated dominant operator produces more when the fringe colludes than when it behaves competitively.
With compléments, the reverse results hold.
Proof See Appendix A. o First, the behavior of the fringe directly affects the demand for the regulated good : since a collusive fringe sets a higher price than a compétitive one, collusion increases the demand for the regulated good 1 when goods are substitutes -and decreases it with compléments. Second, as explained previously, the regulator takes into account the incentive of the collusive fringe to under-produce : he tends to increase the price of good 1 with substitutes, and to decrease it with complementary outputs. This gives rise to an effect, on the demand for the regulated good, that goes against the previous one.
To pave the road for the next proposition, let us now consider the revenue earned from the regulated good. More specifically, let us assume for the moment that the shadow cost of public funds is very large. Then. we obtain which is négative with substitutes, and positive with compléments. This means that when goods are substitutes, the net revenue generated from the sale of the regulated good is larger when the fringe colludes than when it competes. As a conséquence, still with substitutable goods, the subsidy that must be paid to the dominant operator is larger when the fringe behaves competitively than when it colludes. In our model, this is not welfareneutral since taxation is distortionary. And the deadweight loss associated to this subsidy increases with the cost of public funds. A reverse conclusion arises with compléments : enforcing a compétitive behavior from the fringe increases the revenue associated to the sale of the regulated production, which in turns alleviates the need for distortionary taxation.
The case of an infinité shadow cost of public funds is obviously unrealistic. The following proposition applies for finite values of A.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique threshold d{\) e ( -1,0) such that
• the compétition policy authority does not intervene and lets the fringe collude if c^c'(X),
• the compétition policy authority intervenes and prevents the fringe from colluding if c^c'(À).
Moreover, the threshold c'(A) is increasing in A^0.
Proof See Appendix B. d
The two effects at work are the following. First, enforcing a noncooperative behavior from the fringe always increases consumer surplussince the fringe then behaves in a socially optimal way. Second, compétition by the fringe affects the transfer that must be paid to the regulated firm.
Indeed, when goods are substitutes, the compétitive behavior of the fringe leads to an increase in this transfer and, thus, to a distortion due to the social cost of taxation. When goods are compléments, on the other hand, a compétitive behavior decreases the need for such distortionary taxation :
a compétitive fringe produces a larger quantity, which raises consumers' willingness to pay for the regulated good, and therefore reduces the transfer given to the regulated dominant operator.
The two effects go in the same direction and contribute to making antitrust intervention désirable for compléments. But they go against one another when goods are substitutes.
Thèse results can be contrasted to the ones for standard Cournot compétition, without régulation : In such a framework, one would rather tolerate collusion when goods are compléments. Indeed, with compléments, collusion enables firms to internalize the positive externalities arising from réductions in priées, leading to larger price réductions compared to the compétitive price under Cournot compétition. To the contrary, antitrust intervention would be more needed when goods are substitutes, since collusion then leads to higher priées. A major différence between our framework and the 'standard' one is that collusion does not take place between firms producing differentiated goods -the regulated monopoly does not collude with the fringe. Since the regulator maximizes consumer surplus, the effects of price réductions are internalized even when there is no collusion between the fringe and the dominant firm.
Discussion
We examine below whether our results are robust to various assumptions.
• Cournot compétition : Let us consider that there is Cournot compétition between markets. Assume first that if the antitrust authority intervenes then the fringe still sets a price equal to its marginal cost. Our insights carry over to that situation11 : if products are sufRciently substitutable, then it becomes socially préférable to let the fringe collude; otherwise, antitrust intervention on the fringe is socially désirable. Although the value of the threshold is différent, the nature of the compétition between markets has little impact on our results. The intuitions remain the same.\ Assume now that if the fringe behaves competitively, then Cournot compétition also takes place within the fringe; in that case the price set by a compétitive fringe would be différent from the fringe's marginal cost and would no longer be socially efficient. The larger the number of fîrms in the fringe becomes, the larger is the increase in consumers' surplus generated by compétition; However, an increase in the number of firms also reinforces the impact of compétition on the size of the subsidy paid to the dominant operator. The complexity of the mathematical expressions make it difficult to obtain a formai resuit ; simple simulations indicate that, in our framework, when the number of fîrms in the fringe increases, the zone of parameter values such that antitrust intervention is socially préférable, shrinks.
• Intermediate forms of antitrust intervention : The way we hâve formalized the intervention of the compétition policy authority is rather crude. One might for instance consider that the authority can commit to a certain probability of intervention. To keep the modeling as simple as possible, let us consider that the fringe's reaction function is given by :12
We acknowledge that this is a rather ad hoc way of modeling antitrust in tervention. Parameter a is nevertheless a short-cut to model the intensity of antitrust intervention. If a = 0 then the fringe behaves competitively; if a = 1 the fringe acts as a monopolist; the price set by the fringe is increasing with a. We dénote by à the value of the antitrust intervention parameter that maximizes social welfare, which is decided prior to the regulatory contract. Then, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider that the fringe 's réaction function is given by (8). Then, the optimal antitrust intervention policy is defined as follows :
-When products are strong substitutes, the compétition authority lets the fringe collude (i.e., à = 1).
-When products are weak substitutes, the compétition authority allows some collusion (i.e., à G (0,1)).
-When products are compléments, the compétition authority completely deters the fringe from colluding (i.e., à = 0).
Proof See Appendix C. D
Let us focus on the case of weak substitutes. à is decreasing with c:the weaker the substitutability is, the weaker is the impact of the fringe's behavior on the dominant operator's revenue, and the less socially profitable it is to let the fringe collude. For weak substitutes, the antitrust authority accepts an intermediate level of collusive behavior at the level of the fringe.
• Simultaneous timing : In that case, the regulator would no longer be able to alter the fringe's production décision. Notice that this is already the case when the fringe behaves competitively since it priées at marginal cost, whatever the regulated firm's priée. Therefore, the only change concerns the case of a collusive fringe. Not surprisingly, our results still carry over to this case. The interesting différence is that the threshold (above which the fringe is deterred from colluding) is smaller under simultaneous timing than under sequential timing. The intuition is that the regulator cannot influence the décisions taken by the fringe; antitrust intervention is therefore more désirable since it can counter the incentive of the fringe to under-produce under collusion.
• Asymmetric information : Incomplète information from the side of the re gulator also leaves our results qualitatively unchanged.13 The rent extra ction phenomenon that arises under incomplète information is somewhat orthogonal to our focus. Qualitative results are unchanged; indeed, compé tition on the fringe reduces the rent of the firm when goods are substitutes, and increases it when goods are compléments.
Conclusion
We hâve tried to highlight in our model some of the effects that may guide the design of an optimal industry supervision. The most striking resuit is that antitrust intervention might not always enhance welfare in partially regulated environments, even when there are no coordination problem between regulatory and compétition policy authorities, and when antitrust intervention is costless. Moreover, our model highlights a new insight : the nature of the interaction between final goods affects the nature of the interaction between supervision authorities.
With complementary products, antitrust intervention always increases welfare, through two channels : the increase in consurners' surplus, and the réduction in distortionary taxation. Thus, in présence of complementarities, a rationale arises for a complète supervision of ail the firms active in the industry (fringe and dominant operator in our model).
A question that then arises is the following : In our model, could an titrust intervention replace regulatory oversight of the dominant operator ?
The answer will be négative in gênerai14. Indeed, antitrust enforcement 13 Compilations are available at www.enpc.fr/ceras/pouyet. 14 For instance, assume that F = 0 and A = 0. Then one could check immediately that régulation of the dominant operator only is atways preferred to antitrust intervention on the fringe only. The (obvious) reasons cannot counter the tendency to under-produce of the dominant operator; at most, it can deter the fringe from colluding (and possibly deter the domi nant operator from colluding with the fringe), but this precisely reinforces the market power of the dominant operator when outputs are complementary. Finally, in a similar framework to the one used in this paper, Pouyet and Verouden (2001) study the optimal antitrust intervention policy when none of the markets are monopolized. They find that. when goods are strongly complementary, the compétition policy authority is forced to intervene with probability 1 in both markets. highlighting the inability of compétition authorities (in the traditional vision) to cope alone with markets exhibiting a pattern of strong complementarities.
On the other hand. in présence of strong substitutes, enforcing a compétitive behavior would put a strong compétitive pressure on an unregulated dominant operator. One would then like to compare the following situations : régulation of the dominant operator only. or antitrust intervention on the fringe only. Such a comparison relies on exogenous parameters (the cost of public funds on one hand, and the cost of antitrust intervention on the other hand) and clearly calls for a deeper understanding of the functioning of thèse two institutions. This paper constitutes a first step towards such a better understan ding. But much remains to be done in order to answer the daunting questions that arise when one considers the interactions between antitrust and régula tion. In particular, why are there two différent bodies instead of a regulator also endowed with auditing capacities ? Séparation cannot be justified15 in our simple framework, except for reasons based on bounded rationality. Assuming that the authorities can hâve private objectives allows to obtain more complex justifications; séparation may indeed be optimal when there is a risk of capture of the authorities by the industry (see Laffont and Martimort (1999) ). Another interesting question is the following : why are anti trust authorities generally given a différent mandate than regulatory ones ? Again, in our framework, there would be no justification for that. Spulber and Besanko (1992) offer a rationale for asking antitrust authorities to take only into account consumer surplus, and not firms profits. In their frame work, giving this objective to the antitrust authority is a way of committing to an (ex post ineffîcient) intervention in order to deter collusion. But the introduction of a regulated transfer financed through distortionary taxation increases the cost of distorting the objective of the compétition authority in our model, especially when the cost of public funds is large (for example in are the following. First, the regulator possesses a broader set of instruments than the antitrust authority.
Second, he can intervene ex ante (that is, before the production décisions are undertaken at the industry's level), and therefore use this Stackelberg leadership to account for the interaction between the dominant operator's and the fringe's décisions. When the shadow cost of public funds is not too large (a realistic assumption for many developed countries), this reasoning still holds. The denominator is always négative.
When products are compléments, we hâve ---< 0. 
